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 Abstract 
This paper addresses the question “does international democracy promotion work?” It ar-
gues that the simple answer is both yes and no, and that it all depends - on how we define 
democracy promotion and its objectives, and on which particular approaches, methods or 
tools are used to promote democracy.  Most importantly for present purposes is that the 
methods for assessing even the least contentious forms of democracy promotion, namely 
those that are usually called by the name of democracy assistance, are underdeveloped in 
more than one respect. Considerable conceptual and methodological difficulties stand in 
the way of achieving more scientifically verifiable knowledge about them and understand-
ing the connections with actual political change. The assessments that have been carried 
out tend to reach only modest conclusions about international democracy promotion’s ef-
fectiveness and its contribution to democratisation abroad.1 The paper concludes by argu-
ing the relevance of not just trying harder to overcome the difficulties of assessment, but 
in addition integrating assessments and their findings more closely into the policy making 
process. Gaps in the policy process might owe to a combination of political and bureau-
cratic circumstances, or be due to reasons that are inherent in the nature of international 
democracy promotion itself. However, a double shift in how we address the question 
whether democracy promotions works, moving from the ex post assessment of democracy 
assistance to the ex ante appraisal of future policies to promote democracy by all means, 
can only aid strategic thinking about how and, indeed, whether to promote democracy 
abroad and, not least, contribute better to the political fortunes of societies for whose be-
nefit these endeavours are intended. 
                                                 
1  Even though European Union efforts to apply its Copenhagen criteria to would–be accession states con-
stitute a partial exception. See for example Kelley (2004), Vachudova (2005) and Pridham (2005). 
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1 Introduction 
In its position paper Promoting Democracy in German Development Policy the Bundes-
ministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung / German Federal Min-
istry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ 2005) quotes approvingly at the 
very outset former UN Secretary General Kofi Anan’s words, “Democracy does not be-
long to any country or region but is a universal right.” From the late 1980s onwards there 
has been a significant increase in international democracy promotion by all means. The 
number of new organisations set up solely for the purpose of providing democracy as-
sistance, the democracy programmes and projects offered by existing development agen-
cies possessing much broader mandates, and the financial resources allocated to democra-
cy support have all increased significantly, most notably in the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) and its member states, and more recently at the United Nations too. 
Several big arguments have been offered by policy makers in the established democracies 
to explain and justify this development, ranging from the intrinsic universal value of de-
mocracy that imposes some kind of moral obligation on the existing democracies to share 
their good fortune with others, to various kinds of more instrumental rationale grounded in 
the goals of universal peace, global development and prosperity, social justice and mee-
ting ‘new security’ threats such as the uncontrolled migration of peoples and international 
terrorism. Given the profile that international democracy promotion has now acquired at 
the levels both of policy rhetoric and practical engagement, an obvious question to ask is 
whether it actually works. Surely academic analysts, interested think-tanks and, not least, 
the policy–makers and democracy practitioners themselves should all be interested in the 
answer to the question this paper seeks to address: “does international democracy promo-
tion work?” 
First, the answer. Readers might be disappointed to hear that the answer is ‘Both yes…and 
no…and it all depends’. Which in turn means that there are probably more interesting 
questions to do with ‘what works?’, ‘under what conditions?’, and ‘why?’. Even more e-
lemental, ‘how do we know?’ The following sections touch on each one of these. 
But first, what is international democracy promotion (IDP)? 
2 What is IDP? 
There is a confusing lexicon of terms – democracy promotion, democracy support, democ-
racy assistance, democracy aid, political development aid and so on. And just as with ac-
counts of official development assistance, where the Development Assistance Committee 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC-OECD) provides 
us with a commonly accepted working definition, we can cut to chase and anchor oursel-
ves to a respected institutional definition. The European Council of Ministers (2006, 1, 
note1) in its report on “The EU Approach to Democracy Promotion in External Relations. 
Food for Thought” provides this service where it takes the term democracy promotion “to 
encompass the full range of external relations and development cooperation activities 
which contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy in third countries,” 
which is to say “all measures designed to facilitate democratic development” (ibid, 3). 
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So, the end would seem to be clear. As for the means, the approaches, methods, instru-
ments, tools or, even as one writer puts it, weapons, these are many and varied. We can try 
to summarise the set and arrange the relation between them in a number of ways. For in-
stance Levitsky / Way (2005) have two categories: ‘leverage’ and ‘linkage’. An alternative 
approach offered here is to deploy the idea of power as a continuum or gradation of relati-
onships. That runs from, at the ‘soft power’ end, democracy assistance and persuasion and 
other non-coercive forms of influence, through pressure for instance diplomatic pressure, 
political conditionalities and threat of sanctions, all the way to the really hard power or 
coercive end, including the use of force - what might be called democracy intervention in 
the same way as ‘humanitarian intervention’ has come to include forcible interventions 
against the wishes of host governments, justified in the name of fundamental human 
rights. In practice there are bound to be some individual instances of promotion that are 
hard to categorise cleanly. Moreover identical cases are capable of being construed diffe-
rently by different actors, by the different parties to the relationship.  
The reasons to promote democracy, even just those that circulate most prominently in the 
public domain, vary considerably. On the one side, there is democracy conceived as a uni-
versal value (Sen 1999) to which all humankind has an entitlement. Seen from this view-
point the established liberal democracies perhaps have some kind of moral obligation to 
help spread, secure and defend this particular political order. On the other hand there are 
the reasons grounded in its instrumental worth for a considerable array of ‘good things:’ to 
quote the European Council of Ministers (2006, 2) again, “The embedding of democracy 
and democratic process in third countries holds out the best prospect for the development 
by them of effective policies related to global issues of particular concern to EU citizens.” 
Comparable sentiments have been expressed by the White House in Washington DC and 
from the capitals of other countries around the world, from Canada to Australia and, not 
least, in the United Nations, where not only successive Secretary Generals but the loosely 
organised intergovernmental Community of Democracies have strongly emphasised both 
democracy’s intrinsic and its instrumental value. 
So, does IDP work? A question that is simple to ask, a question that clearly should be 
asked, but not one that is anything like straightforward to answer. For several reasons. 
3 In terms of what does IDP work? 
First we must be more specific: in terms what does IDP work? Do we mean is it effective 
in terms of promoting democracy? Or promoting the conditions (and, if you believe there 
are some preconditions, those too) for democracy? Or promoting the ends that are suppo-
sed to be realised through democratisation? It is entirely feasible that IDP might be suc-
cessful in terms of furthering democratisation, but either democratisation, or the way in 
which it is brought about as a result of IDP, proves less than effective in dealing with the 
problems to which it is supposed to be a solution. This possibility is made all the more li-
kely by the great variety of goals associated with achieving democracy, and by the fact 
that the goals themselves or the process of reaching them do not have a nice orderly sym-
biotic relationship to one another. In short, there may be tensions, trade-offs, opportunity 
costs, at least in the short to medium terms. To illustrate, there are countries – failed states 
and weak states - where for the time being establishing political stability is (or perhaps 
should be) the priority. Democracy building there might get in the way, even though a 
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concentration on state building now might itself frustrate the prospects for democratisation 
later on.2 More generally one of the lessons we learn from international development coo-
peration is that setting multiple goals for a single form of intervention can result in none of 
the goals being achieved to anyone’s satisfaction.  
So, to make life simpler the rest of the discussion here will be narrowed to the more im-
mediate objective: does democracy promotion promote democracy and democracy’s req-
uisites? 
4 What works in democracy promotion? 
Given the plurality of different methods or approaches to promoting democracy, it would 
be unwise to expect one single overarching judgment about effectiveness. There is a prob-
lem here in that the different methods, tools and so on for promoting democracy tend to 
aim at different objectives, each one of which may have to be measured in its own way, 
and by its own standards of achievement. This complicates the business of making compa-
risons across methods let alone frustrates the desire to arrive at some sort of consolidated 
judgment. To illustrate, establishing whether the attachment of political conditionalities to, 
say, a trade deal really does incentivise a government to make certain concessions – such 
as legislating more civil liberties and political rights – differs from identifying whether the 
sponsorship of social learning, socialisation or acculturation into democratic values really 
does change attitudes and not merely the outward behaviour, and whether it really does 
bring about a principled commitment to democracy rather than a more calculated defer-
ence primarily interested in acquiring the side benefits of external legitimacy and respect. 
Then, when reaching out and seeking to effect change, whether in attitudes or behaviour 
or both, there is the issue of who matters most: critical segments of the political elite, or 
the mass of ordinary people? 
In recent years there has been some impressive independent research carried out on some 
specific approaches to promoting democracy especially on EU efforts (for example Kelley 
2004; Vachudova 2005); and there has also been some research into a number of the in-
struments and their effectiveness when employed on behalf of other ends than democracy 
or used in rather different international contexts. Trade sanctions and investment embar-
goes in the cases of Cuba and apartheid South Africa are two examples. On these, the pic-
ture we get from quite a wealth of research – a rich evidence base but by no means com-
prehensive or systematic – is very mixed. In the matter of sanctions, for instance, the risk 
of ‘double jeopardy’ tends to loom very large, that is to say it is the powerless in society 
who tend to suffer most, with no certainty that the regime will change – think of Zim-
babwe under Mugabe, or Myanmar.  
In the case of political conditionalities, there is a good story to tell at least in regard to the 
EU and its application of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria to accession candidates. There is 
near universal agreement on this. But there is also disagreement on how meaningful the 
changes really are in respect of building good democracy in the prospective new member 
states. No less significant there is disagreement on how and why conditionality has made a 
                                                 
2  Thomas Carothers (2007) for instance has recently offered some interesting views on this. 
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positive contribution. For instance there are contrasting views on whether conditionality 
worked less because of its own intrinsic merits and more by virtue of being combined with 
other methods or tools, like democracy assistance. Or, possibly much more significant e-
ven than that, perhaps conditionality worked by and through interaction with domestic 
constituencies for democratic change in the accession countries. That is to say, the results 
all depend on how far local actors in the country take advantage of the new political space 
that conditionality-based pressure applied to their government has helped create. The criti-
cal nature of the domestic input to the shape of the end result, as it were, is a point that 
comes out very strongly in many of the most closely informed field studies of democracy 
support – investigations that have used method of process tracing to get a handle on the 
reasons why things turned out the way they did (see for example Åslund / McFaul 2006, 
on Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’). To say this is in no way to deny that international dif-
fusion, too, plays a role in sparking democratic transitions, and that there can be ‘neigh-
bourhood’ effects (both favourable and unfavourable to democracy’s diffusion), and that 
in certain cases like the European Union, membership of a regional organisation can help 
to consolidate democratic reforms, which is what Pevehouse (2002) claims the analysis of 
event history tells us.  
All things considered, however, there is a shortage of robust frameworks for comparing 
the effectiveness of different instruments or combinations of instruments – approaches that 
themselves make use of ‘inputs’ that vary so greatly in kind that it is difficult to know how 
even they can be compared, let alone establish and then compare the relative rates of re-
turn. Therefore, and once again to make life simple, I narrow the discussion down further, 
by concentrating on just democracy assistance pure and simple (DA). DA comprises non-
threatening, largely concessional, that is grant-aided transfers of support (material, techni-
cal, and financial) to pro-democracy initiatives of the sort we are all familiar with: electi-
ons observation; improving electoral management capability; capacity building in civil 
society, legislative strengthening, even help with building political parties, and so on. E-
ven then, the best way to categorise some specific initiatives can be ambiguous. At the one 
end, in some low income countries under stress DA shades off into conflict management 
techniques and peace and reconciliation efforts. And in countries that are judged to be 
highly strategic in geopolitical terms countries attempts to influence the structure of civili-
an-military relations, too, can look like democracy assistance, when viewed from one ang-
le, but may look more like ‘security assistance’ when viewed from another. And at the  
other end there is an equally blurry border with attempts to create better governance and, 
beyond that, improvements in public policy for things like managing the economy. 
In view of the complexity of the issue, this is a good place to introduce a yet further self-
limiting clause into the assessment here. Assessing whether DA (i.e. political projects and 
programmes aimed directly at certain political objectives) works, is quite enough to be 
going on with, without investigating indirect approaches to promoting democracy through 
seeking to influence democracy’s conditions or prerequisites, most notably the economic 
factors. That economic well-being helps make stable democracy sustainable is about as 
close to an iron law as political science gets – almost on a par with the democratic peace 
theory that says democracies do not usually go to war with one another. But it may not be 
very interesting for democracy promoters, given the various caveats and qualifications that 
could be introduced. For instance: is there some minimum threshold of economic achie-
vement that must be met first? We do know that some very poor countries such as India 
have sustained democracy over many years. And we also know that some relatively 
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prosperous countries have yet to get there – and may never get there, Singapore and liberal 
democracy for example. The quality of democracy in a number of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries is - according to the critics – 
moving in inverse direction to their increasing material wealth. Furthermore, development 
economists have yet to come up with a commonly agreed recipe for delivering economic 
development in the challenging circumstances that many low income and developing 
countries present. Some advisers argue for more development aid, while others suggest 
that the limits of aid absorptive capacity have already been met or even exceeded (see for 
example Browne 2006; Easterly 2006). And, of course, in the real world as distinct from 
the economic textbooks, foreign aid allocations are in any case influenced by geo-strategic 
and other extraneous considerations as much as they are by concern for the likely devel-
opmental pay-off – let alone being guided by the indirect consequences for democracy in 
the partner countries. 
So, development assistance could be one way of trying to assist democratisation; and there 
are indications that more of development aid is now going to countries with better civil 
liberties and political rights compared to the Cold War period (Sundberg / Gelb 2006, 16). 
Moreover, if as Faust (2006) argues, more democratic donor countries are more commit-
ted to development in poor countries, then there is the happy possibility of a kind of virtu-
ous circle emerging, of benefit to development and democratisation, if not now then in the 
future. Nevertheless, the discussion here does not pursue these complex and contested is-
sues, but instead stays with the simpler question: does direct democracy assistance work? 
Obviously, I am not the first to pose the question, let alone the first to hazard an answer. 
And yet there is a remarkable dearth of certain knowledge about best practice in democra-
cy support, relative to the substantial accumulated understanding we now have of what 
seems not to work well and of the reasons why not. In regard to what does work, democ-
racy practitioners do not show an abundant confidence about having the answers, not least 
because the methodology, or methodologies, for finding out this information are by com-
mon consent underdeveloped. Moreover the methods are prone to some well known short-
comings and flaws. However, before proceeding to explore this aspect further, a short de-
tour into the empirical realm of assessments will convey the flavour of some attempts that 
have recently been made to shed light on the issue of how well does it work. 
5 Some findings from democracy assistance assessments 
Let me first look at the EU, which together with the democracy aid of its member states 
accounts for around US$ 3 billion expenditure on democracy, governance and related ac-
tivities annually, and which is more than the US spend on similar goals. The European 
Commission’s Thematic Evaluation of EC Support to Good Governance (Bossuyt et al. 
2006), notwithstanding the report’s s title, in fact takes in a selection of EU democracy 
and human rights support efforts, too, drawing on fieldwork research conducted in count-
ries as diverse as Ukraine and Indonesia, Angola and Guatemala. And rather helpful to our 
purposes the report also includes a summary of lessons learned from some other donors’ 
evaluations, stating that “Overall, the impact of external assistance has been at best mod-
est” (ibid., Volume 2, Annex 12, 1). Indeed, “some of the most successful initiatives have 
deliberately eschewed (avoided) external support”! (ibid.) While the report is willing to 
say that the Commission has made “significant progress with its use of political and pol-
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icy dialogue as a strategic tool,” (ibid., Vol. 1, 55) the best it is prepared to say about the 
assistance projects and programmes is that they “can, under certain conditions, be effec-
tive and efficient tools.” (ibid., Vol. 1, 46) At the same time – and as already indicated 
more generally – the report adds the qualifying statement that it is the local environment in 
the partner countries that is the main determinant of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness 
otherwise of EU support. Thus, “the jury is still out on whether the assistance outcomes 
will be sustained over time and lead to systemic changes at the level of a given country, 
situation, or civil society organisation” (Bossuyt et al. 2006, Volume 1, Executive Sum-
mary, 5).  
Second, a slightly more up-beat but still sobering assessment of democracy assistance 
comes from US Agency for International Development (USAID), the largest national pro-
vider of such projects and programmes. A USAID commissioned evaluation (Finkel et al. 
2006) concluded that over the period studied, 1990–2003, USAID’s democracy and gov-
ernance assistance to well over one hundred countries on average left them with higher 
Freedom House and Polity IV scores for democracy than they could have been expected to 
achieve otherwise. The study surmised that the benefits were lagged and cumulative. Inte-
restingly the findings for human rights support were negative. The overall democracy 
dividend was itself very small anyway, because the aid commitment had been so very 
small (the average eligible country received only US$ 2.07 million per year during the pe-
riod). Unlike the EU study which drew on a number of qualitative sources (interviews; 
focus groups, and so on) as well as quantitative analysis, the report commissioned by 
USAID was exclusively and rigorously quantitative, which means that it carries all the po-
tential pitfalls associated with gathering and interpreting evidence on that basis. 
Third, and down at the qualitative end of methodology there is by now a substantial volu-
me of studies by dedicated democracy assistance watchers located in academia and think 
tanks, of whom Thomas Carothers is easily the most pre-eminent (Carothers 1999 is a se-
minal work), together with institutional level studies by some democracy assistance agen-
cies themselves. Thus Carothers for example has steadily moved through the different DA 
sectors, producing big books on civil society, on strengthening the rule of law, and, most 
recently, on party aid (Carothers 2006). In none of these sectors do we find him offering a 
very rosy assessment. For the time being anyway parties and party support in emerging 
democracies are something like the ‘flavour of the month’, at least in terms of talk, al-
though the evidence of performance to date looks no more convincing and the challenges 
look no easier than in respect of the other sectors of democracy support (e.g. see also 
Burnell 2006a; 2006c; Erdmann 2006; Hällhag 2006). 
Aside from the routine monitoring and the less frequent set-piece assessments of their de-
mocracy work by such development cooperation actors as DANIDA (Danish International 
Development Agency), SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) 
and Germany’s GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), two fairly 
recent but contrasting examples of organisational evaluation among the publicly funded 
democracy foundations are one of the Dutch Institute for Multiparty Democracy (Euro-
pean Centre for Development Policy Management 2005) and one of Britain’s Westminster 
Foundation Democracy (River Path Associates 2005). The former generally speaking ca-
me up with a very positive account of the institution and its approach; the latter was much 
more critical. Now, putting these accounts together with Carothers’ work and studies in 
the academic literature, and trying to come up with the equivalent of an aggregate score 
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for democracy assistance - which is probably a really stupid thing to try to do (partly for 
reasons to be explained shortly) – my guess for marks out of ten would be somewhere a-
round 3.5. That is not very impressive - although it might compare quite favourably with 
the extent of political commitment as measured by the resources of money and personnel 
and the willingness to override competing foreign policy goals that the established democ-
racies have so far put in (see Youngs 2006). Be that as it may, even these figures should 
be taken with a pinch of salt, given that one thing we can be more certain about is: we do 
not really know how well democracy assistance is working. That is to say, we know that 
we do not know. And that before coming to any further conclusions we must work harder 
to improve our methods for assessing democracy support, if we are to say things with 
greater confidence about either the evaluation processes or the results. This brings us back 
to the core issue here, namely why is assessing democracy assistance so difficult? 
6 Why is assessing democracy assistance so difficult? 
Even after narrowing down the challenge to weighing up the performance of direct sup-
port to democratisation by assistance alone, and without even looking at the policy drivers 
or rationales that lie behind this, it is easy to develop a long list of conundrums afflicting 
the business of assessment. What follows is a sort of top ten list (see also USAID 2005; 
Green / Kohl 2007). 
6.1 What is, or what counts as, sustainable democracy and democratic progress? Where 
are the borders between these and human rights, and the rule of law, and better governan-
ce? If political governance is in, but economic governance is out, where does the dividing 
line fall? And what about the governance that goes on outside, beneath and below  
governments? Are the analytical boundaries between democracy on the one hand and de-
mocracy’s conditions or prerequisites on the other sharply delineated and commonly 
agreed? Where for instance do we place political culture: does civic culture, however defi-
ned, supply one of democracy’s defining terms? Or is it a necessary condition in order for 
democracy to become consolidated? Or is it neither of these, or both of them?  
6.2 How do we measure and compare improvement, especially if, as many commentators 
acknowledge, democracy can quite legitimately take different forms depending on the his-
torical and cultural foundations of society (BMZ 2005, 5)? There are alternative, one 
might even say competing, frameworks and associated indicators on offer, ranging from 
the more minimalist to the most maximalist. Even some of the most widely used proxies 
have attracted criticism, not least the Freedom House freedom ratings. See for example the 
United Nations Development Programme Governance Centre in Oslo, which aspires to 
develop a more locally owned - and that means locally responsive - set of indicators 
(UNDP s. a.). 
6.3 Should we be aspiring to measure democratic progress in quantitative terms anyway? 
While the qualitative profiling of democracy is currently fashionable (see for example 
Merkel 2004) and we can attempt to attach relative weightings to the different democratic 
properties such as accountability and participation, these exercises are inevitably still 
judgmental and they leave open considerable discretion over how we arrive at some ag-
gregate figure (Coppedge 2002). In this situation unanimous verdicts about the precise ex-
tent of movement towards or away from democracy look most unlikely. 
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6.4 If measuring the output of a democracy assistance effort looks relatively simple, asses-
sing the outcomes is much more difficult. The effectiveness of democracy assistance in a 
particular sector, say a civil society capacity building programme, might be represented in 
the number of viable new civil society organisations that are helped to get off the ground. 
But the impact, meaning what that does for civil society and what that in turn does for 
democratisation, is not so obvious. Just how do we filter out the influence on outcomes 
exerted by ‘noise in the system’ – the influence of the other democracy assistance pro-
grammes and of other democracy assistance actors working in this or related sectors, po-
litical party support for instance? And how do we filter out all the other influences, both 
domestic and foreign, positive and negative - what might be called passive as distinct from 
active (that is to say, intentional) promotion of democracy (see Burnell 2006b)? This filte-
ring can be extraordinarily difficult in those complex situations where international invol-
vement in peace-making, state building, economic reconstruction and humanitarian inter-
ventions are all taking place side by side. The problem leads directly to the next co-
nundrum. 
6.5 There is the vexed question of assigning effects to a specific cause, that is attribution. 
How can we prove beyond doubt that a certain consequence was ‘caused’ by this or that 
initiative in democracy aid, given that we can never know the counterfactual, that is, what 
would have happened in the absence of external involvement? Correlations and co-
variations are all very interesting, but in trying to make sense of connections – which is an 
exercise that could be more interesting and certainly more useful for policy-making – how 
can we be so sure that there is a connection in the first place? 
6.6 What is the most appropriate time horizon and what is the right timing – the best cen-
sus date – for collecting evidence of achievement (or lack of achievement)? Projects might 
have to promise quick results in order to qualify for political and financial backing, but 
building democracy can be a long haul and the benefits slow to appear – and, hence, best 
audited later rather than sooner. 
6.7 Should we, and if so, how do we, factor in the amount of resistance or the obstacles to 
democratic reform, when trying to assess and compare instances of success and failure? 
After all, not only the existing power-holders but many people in society, too, might be 
suspicious or fearful of change. Remember, there are situations where the question 
whether or not to democratise is not the only – or even the main – game in town. Another 
way of putting the point is that countries differ in their capacity to effect democratic chan-
ge and also in their absorptive capacity for democracy support, which is their potential to 
derive real and lasting benefit from it. So perhaps assessing the performance of democracy 
assistance might be a bit like scoring an Olympic games high diving event – award one 
score for the degree of difficulty and a second score for the standard of execution, but with 
a further adjustment to the marks that takes potential into account (perhaps a discount rate 
should be applied in the case of performers who were able to train full-time in well equip-
ped United States’ colleges or the Chinese military academy compared to those who have 
had to earn their livelihood in other ways while simultaneously preparing to compete in 
poor and badly equipped developing countries). To illustrate, EU conditionalities have 
worked, but in the easy cases, where the ‘carrot,’ namely admission to the EU, has been 
hard to resist. Surely the true test comes in the ‘new neighbourhood states’ where every-
one knows that EU accession will never be on offer and the countries are economically 
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less well developed and in some cases have relatively very weak state structures and ad-
ministrative capabilities. 
6.8 In democracy assistance, views on what a good assessment looks like will vary along 
with ideas about the purpose of making assessments in the first place. Is it to make democ-
racy assistance practitioners accountable? To insulate them from arbitrary political interfe-
rence? To ensure ‘value-for-money’? A public relations exercise? To review experience 
and learn lessons from that? Different DA organisations and different interested parties 
take different positions on these puzzles. Perhaps one of the more significant points of po-
larisation in this particular debate about methods involves the belief that assessments must 
be as participatory as possible, as befits the notion that both democracy and democratisati-
on themselves must be participatory phenomena. This spills over into a belief that the par-
ticipatory assessment of democracy aid itself is – or should be turned into – a vehicle for 
building democracy. Ranged on the other side however are commentators who are less 
passionate about participatory assessment, inclined to be more sceptical about the benefits 
and emphasise the difficulties, distortions and costs (examples can be found in Green and 
Kohl 2007), as well as analysts whose very ideas of democracy and democratisation attach 
less significance to the participatory content. Put differently, then, the answer to the ques-
tion what do we learn from assessing DA in part depends on what we think assessing DA 
should set out to do: that is to say, the main objective(s) of doing an assessment. 
6.9 Knowledge sharing: only recently has there been much of an effort to share understan-
ding about assessment methods for DA (see Burnell 2007b), but is even this welcome de-
velopment but an imperfect substitute for exchanging results – an admission that we have 
little certain knowledge of DA success or failure, or, perhaps, a reluctance to disclose what 
is known for fear of embarrassment or because to do so might breach legitimate confiden-
tialities, place overseas partners in peril, or require more candour about the true motives 
and intentions of DA than policy makers feel able to reveal. To illustrate, a project authen-
tically aimed at aiding democracy might be defined and presented in terms of human 
rights or governance in order to win acceptability, but what criteria should then be used to 
measure its performance? And what should be communicated to other members of the 
democracy assistance industry, where it would be only natural for each actor to want to 
put only its best foot forward? 
6.10 Finally, rounding off the top ten list brings us to the issue of institutional learning, 
which is something that the report on the EU already mentioned (Bossuyt et al. 2006) says 
is woefully lacking in the EU at least. Indeed, if there is one lesson to be culled from all 
the literature on DA that is more striking than all the rest, it is this lack of institutional 
learning. An outlier can be found in the report by Cole et al. (2006) on the UNDP’s Office 
of Evaluation, although that looked at learning in the UNDP’s development programmes 
before its recent considerable expansion into democratic governance support (now running 
close to US$ 1.5 billion annually), where the findings of repeat investigation conducted 
against this new background would potentially offer very interesting reading. 
In reality there is a double deficit here. First, there seems to be only limited capability to 
benefit from the lengthy experience of international development cooperation, where 
mistakes have been made in the past, lessons learned, and where development economists 
do have some relevant advice to give. And second, there is a failure to take note of and 
respond appropriately to an emerging body of lessons from doing democracy assistance. 
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This deficit refers then both to the under-institutionalisation of procedures for creating 
institutional memory (on both a collective and individual agency basis) and to an absence 
of joined-up relations between DA practice and the democracy promotion policy process. 
It is as if there needs to be a double shift (Burnell forthcoming/a): from ex post (after the 
event) to ex ante (ahead of time), and from assessing DA alone to appraising democracy 
promotion by all means possible, namely the full complement of tools, methods or ap-
proaches and their different combinations. In a nutshell, there is scope for more strategic 
thinking (see Burnell 2005). That is the single most important proposition in this whole 
discussion. Which makes it appropriate to finish with just a few albeit rudimentary sug-
gestions trying to explain the gap, between the ex post assessment of DA and ex ante ap-
praisal of democracy promotion: a ‘starter pack’ to prompt further reflection. 
7 Exploring the policy process gap? 
There are at least three directions in which the policy process gap in democracy promotion 
assessment might be explored by future research and they are not necessarily mutually in-
consistent. 
First, the view might be taken that the problem is inherent in the nature of international 
democracy promotion – a fuzzy, loose, multifaceted assortment of endeavours, engaged in 
by a diverse plurality of actors of different sorts. Inevitably, this leads to incoherence in 
terms of the aims, goals, objectives and thereby indicators. This, in turn, is a constraining 
force on useful learning – learning that influences strategy and policy – at the level of the 
individual agency and the democracy support industry as a whole. Added to which, unlike 
in international development cooperation, there is no one dominant central supplier like 
the World Bank with the resources and the incentive to try to make the practice of democ-
racy assistance evaluation more professional. USAID’s recent efforts to improve its as-
sessment procedures come closest (see Sarles 2007). The full bundle of requisites that 
sound evaluations of anything demand – clarity of purpose, well defined goals, explicit 
programme logics, measurability of performance – is perhaps too much to ask. And that 
means the chances of making a sound assessment are blighted from the start.  
A second way of going about trying to explain the gap would be by citing bureaucratic 
failings: poor communication links between programme designers, practitioners, and as-
sessors, and between the very different actors who would claim to be involved in democ-
racy promotion even within the same institution or the same government or intergovern-
mental machine. At times these disconnects are exacerbated by the fact that the authorities 
who commission studies of democracy assistance are not themselves the implementing 
actors. For example, independent consultants report their findings about the performance 
of a purportedly autonomous political foundation to the development aid ministry or the 
foreign ministry that supplied its funds, with the result that none of the three parties invol-
ved has a very strong sense of ownership of the report or is wholly satisfied with its re-
commendations. Similarly academic writings are read mainly, if at all, by other academics 
and tend not to be couched in a form that are accessible to hard-pressed policy personnel 
or to practitioners stationed far away in the field. 
A third approach to exploring the gap then focuses much more on political reasons. For 
much of the time the ‘high policy’ makers in international politics are simply too busy, or 
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too distracted by other more pressing priorities to pay much attention to the question of 
whether democracy assistance and promotion work or do not work. And in any case it is 
only to be expected – and perhaps is only right – that the political decision to lend support 
to democratisation around the world is influenced by other considerations than technocra-
tic issues concerning which approach works best. Put differently, even if much of democ-
racy assistance could be scientifically proven to be largely ineffective in its own terms the-
re might still be other – even good – reasons for the commitment to remain in place. For 
instance as a response to demands expressed by the electorate at home or by peoples des-
perately struggling for basic political freedoms abroad – at minimum as a symbolic ges-
ture to international solidarity. After all, which government in the West can be expected to 
stand up at the present time and say that trying to support democracy or human rights 
abroad is a bad thing, a waste of time?  
And the converse could well be true, too. That is to say, even if DA could be scientifically 
shown to be highly effective at supporting democratisation, there might be reasons and 
possibly good reasons to become less supportive. In time its relevance may come to be 
questioned. Such as when democratic change far from realising all the good things that 
have been associated with it instead appears to bring less desirable consequences in its 
train in the short to medium term, anyway. Examples could include political instability, 
tense relationships between governments that previously were on good terms or elected 
governments that turn out to be unfriendly. There could also be an environment in which 
democratic contestants for power quite understandably put key interest group demands at 
home and the domestic political imperative of deferring to short-term electoral opinion 
above pursuing the rational long term needs of global society – cutting carbon emissions 
to slow down global warming for instance.  
But of course the discussion is now drifting dangerously close to the rocks of speculation, 
controversy, in short, the policy drivers that lie behind the political interest in promoting 
democracy. So this is a good place to put down the anchor and reach some sort of conclu-
sion.  
8 Conclusion 
Does international democracy promotion work? Yes, … and No.  
‘Yes’ in so far as there is a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest that some cases of 
democracy promotion have had some effect especially when we go on to specify the cases 
more closely in terms of approach, time, place and circumstance. But that is not the same 
thing as overall impact; and it certainly leaves open the distinct possibility that either one 
of other and unintended influences from outside or domestic influences from within or 
both played a much stronger determining role. 
So ‘No’, for notwithstanding near on 20 years of international democracy promotion, and 
writing at a time when the most recent ‘wave’ of democracy or democratisation appears to 
have peaked, still under half the countries in the world and less than half of humankind 
live in political systems that most conventional judgments would call liberal democracies. 
Furthermore few if any people live in a more democratically enriched version of democra-
cy than liberal democracy, such as highly participatory forms of democracy let alone the 
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much more egalitarian forms of social democracy that radical writers have mused on down 
the years. Moreover, the quality of democracy even in some of the longer established de-
mocracies like the US and UK is considered by serious observers to be facing major prob-
lems or is already in steep decline. 
‘Yes? No? We Really do not Know’. Because the art of assessing democracy support has 
not yet caught up with the art of assessing the state of democracy – something that itself is 
still in flux. In reality only now are we beginning to compare and think of ways of impro-
ving on the existing methods for evaluating democracy support. The issue of who is best 
placed to answer questions about whether democracy support works or not, and how well 
it works, is up for grabs. But when compared to what are variously called the partners, 
clients, recipients, or other final stakeholders of such support, readers in the democracy 
promoting countries may not be the most appropriate people to judge whether it is wor-
king or not. No one can be confident that we know and understand enough to make clear, 
clean, confident judgments – except in terms of some very broad brush generalisations of 
the sort that may not be very useful to policy makers. 
What we are not short of, however, is explanations of why democracy assistance fails, as-
suming it is not difficult to agree on what failure means in this context, whether in some 
absolute sense or relative to ambition. It is ironic that while we flounder around trying to 
measure the benefit that democracy assistance means for democratisation, very little atten-
tion seems to be given to finding out when, where, and under what circumstances democ-
racy promotion not merely fails but actually does more harm than good. Just as in efforts 
in international development cooperation, there may be cases where the endeavours actual-
ly do a disservice to the cause that is sought. Or, if not quite that, cases where democracy 
support leads to excessive collateral damage along the way, unsought after-consequences 
for other desired values inside the partner countries – for social order, political stability, 
governance capability and so on. After all, knowledge about what works can be a power-
ful tool – no less so than when it ends up in the wrong hands. We are still toiling in the 
foothills of establishing what can be known with any real certainty. And in regard to reali-
sing the potential benefits of institutional learning there still seems to be a very long way 
to go. While it might well be true to say that experience in recent decades shows there are 
no foolproof ‘road maps for successful promotion of democracy’ (BMZ 2005, 9), clearly 
that is no reason for not trying to improve on the situation from here on. 
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